Per approfondire ulteriormente

Raccomandabile!

"CHE" - El sitio más completo sobre el Che en Bolivia

www.chebolivia.org

Il sito più completo sul Che in Bolivia, un piccolo portale da cui sono scaricabili

i seguenti documenti:

El Diario del Che en Bolivia

Il Diario del Che in Bolivia

Gli ultimi appunti del 7 ottobre 1967

 Transcripción del Diario del Che en Bolivia, Edición cotejada con el manuscrito

original

Trascrizione ufficiale del del Diario del Che in Bolivia, Edizione confrontata con

il manoscritto originale

 Manuscrito original del Diario del Che en Bolivia

Manoscritto originale del Diario del Che in Bolivia 

Serie:

El Che en Bolivia - Documentos y testimonios

Il Che in Bolivia - Documenti e testimoni

 Tomo I - Su diario de campaña

Prima parte - Il suo diario della campagna

 Tomo II - Los otros diarios

Seconda parte - Gli altri diari

 Tomo III - Su último combate

Terza parte - Il suo ultimo combattimento

 Tomo IV - ¿Traición del PCB?

Quarta parte - Il tradimento del PBC? (Partito Comunista Boliviano)

 Tomo V - Pensamiento Boliviano

Quinta parte - Il pensiero boliviano

Scaricali qui (i documenti testuali potrai tradurli online):

Diario del Che en Bolivia

Manuscrito

original

Transcripción

Edición cotejada con

el manuscrito original

El Che en Bolivia - Documentos y testimonios

Tomo I

Su diario de

campaña 

Tomo II

Los otros

diarios

Tomo III

Su último

combate

Tomo IV

¿Traición

del PCB?

Tomo V

Pensamiento

Boliviano

Da sinistra a destra Fidel Castro, Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado, Che Guevara, Augusto

Martínez e Antonio Núñez Jimenez in testa alla marcia commemorativa in memoria

delle vittime dell'esplosione a La Coubre, Cuba, 1960

Aggiornamento n. 1

The Death of Che Guevara: Declassified

By Peter Kornbluh

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 5

The National Security Archive - The George Washington University

On October 9th, 1967, Ernesto "Che" Guevara was put to death by Bolivian soldiers,

trained, equipped and guided by U.S. Green Beret and CIA operatives.

His execution remains a historic and controversial event;

and thirty years later, the circumstances of his guerrilla foray into Bolivia, his

capture, killing, and burial are still the subject of intense public interest and

discussion around the world.

As part of the thirtieth anniversary of the death of Che Guevara, the Security

Archive's Cuba Documentation Project is posting a selection of National key CIA,

State Department, and Pentagon documentation relating to Guevara and his death.

This electronic documents book is compiled from declassified records obtained by

the National Security Archive, and by authors of two new books on Guevara:

Jorge Castañeda's "Compañero: The Life and Death of Che Guevara", [Alfred A.]

Knopf, [1997] and Henry Butterfield Ryan's "The Fall of Che Guevara", Oxford

University Press, [2003].

The selected documents, presented in order of the events they depict, provide only

a partial picture of U.S. intelligence and military assessments, reports and extensive

operations to track and "destroy" Che Guevara's guerrillas in Bolivia;

thousands of CIA and military records on Guevara remain classified.

But they do offer significant and valuable information on the high-level U.S. interest

in tracking his revolutionary activities, and U.S. and Bolivian actions leading up to his

death.

La morte di Che Guevara: documenti declassificati

Di Peter Kornbluh

Archivio Elettronico della Sicurezza Nazionale, Raccolta V di Note Informative

Archivio Elettronico della Sicurezza Nazionale - Università George Washington

Il 9 ottobre 1967 Ernesto "Che" Guevara fu ucciso da soldati boliviani, addestrati,

equipaggiati e guidati dai Berretti Verdi degli Stati Uniti e da agenti della CIA.

La sua esecuzione rimane un evento storico e controverso;

e trent'anni dopo, le circostanze della sua campagna di guerriglia in Bolivia, la sua

cattura, uccisione e sepoltura sono ancora oggetto di intenso interesse pubblico e

discussione in tutto il mondo.
 

Come parte del trentesimo anniversario della morte di Che Guevara, l'Archivio della

Sicurezza Nazionale, Progetto di Documentazione su Cuba, pubblica una selezione

della documentazione chiave della CIA, del Dipartimento di Stato e del Pentagono

relativa a Guevara e alla sua morte.

Questo libro di documenti elettronici è compilato da documenti declassificati

ottenuti dall'Archivio della Sicurezza Nazionale, e dagli autori di due nuovi libri su

Guevara: "Compañero: La vita e morte di Che Guevara" di Jorge Castañeda, [Alfred

A.] Knopf editore, [1997], e "La Caduta di Che Guevara" di Henry Butterfield Ryan,

Oxford University Press, [2003].

I documenti selezionati, presentati nell'ordine degli eventi che descrivono,

forniscono solo un quadro parziale dell'Intelligence statunitense e delle valutazioni

militari, rapporti e vaste operazioni per rintracciare e "distruggere" i guerriglieri di

Che Guevara in Bolivia;

migliaia di documenti della CIA e dell'Esercito su Guevara rimangono riservati.

Ma offrono comunque informazioni significative e preziose sull'interesse di alto

livello degli Stati Uniti nel monitorare le sue attività rivoluzionarie e le azioni degli

Stati Uniti e della Bolivia che hanno portato alla sua morte.

18 ottobre 1965

CIA, The Fall of Che Guevara and the  Changing Face of the

Cuban Revolution

CIA, La caduta di Che Guevara e il cambiamento di indirizzo

della Rivoluzione Cubana

This intelligence memorandum, written by a young CIA analyst, Brian Latell, presents

an assessment that Guevara's preeminence as a leader of the Cuban revolution has

waned, and his internal and international policies have been abandoned.

In domestic policy, his economic strategy of rapid industrialization has "brought the

economy to its lowest point since Castro came to power", the paper argues.

In foreign policy, he "never wavered from his firm revolutionary stand, even as

other Cuban leaders began to devote most of their attention to the internal

problems of the revolution".

With Guevara no longer in Cuba, the CIA's assessment concludes, "there is no doubt

that Castro's more cautious position on exporting revolution, as well as his different

economic approach, led to Che's downfall".

Scarica il documento qui

28 aprile 1967

U.S. Army, Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the

Activation, Organization and Training of the 2nd Battalion

- Bolivian Army

Esercito Statunitenze, Memorandum d'intesa riguardante

la costituzione, l'organizzazione e l'addestramento del

2° Battaglione - Esercito Boliviano

This memorandum of understanding, written by the head of the U.S. MILGP (Military

Group) in Bolivia and signed by the Commander of the Bolivian Armed Forces,

created the Second Ranger Battalion to pursue Che Guevara's guerrilla band.

The agreement specifies the mission of a sixteen-member Green Beret team of U.S.

special forces, drawn from the 8th Special Forces division of the U.S. Army Forces at

Southcom in Panama, to "produce a rapid reaction force capable of counter-

insurgency operations and skilled to the degree that four months of intensive

training can be absorbed by the personnel presented by the Bolivian Armed

Forces".

In October, the 2nd Battalion, aided by U.S. military and CIA personnel, did engage

and capture Che Guevara's small band of rebels.

Scarica il documento qui (traducibile online)

11 maggio 1967

White House Memorandum

La Casa Bianca, Promemoria

This short memo to President Lyndon Johnson records U.S. efforts to track

Guevara's movements, and keep the President informed of his whereabouts.

Written by presidential advisor, Walt Rostow, the memo reports that Guevara may be

"operational" and not dead as the CIA apparently believed after his disappearance

from Cuba.

Scarica il documento qui (traducibile online)

9 ottobre 1967

White House Memorandum

La Casa Bianca, Promemoria

Walt Rostow reports in this memorandum to President Johnson that unconfirmed

information suggests that the Bolivian battalion - "the one we have been training" -

"got Che Guevara".

Scarica il documento qui (traducibile online)

10 ottobre 1967

White House Memorandum

La Casa Bianca, Promemoria

In a short update to Walt Rostow, William Bowdler reports there is still uncertainty

about whether Che Guevara was "among the casualties of the October 8

engagement".

Scarica il documento qui (traducibile online)

11 ottobre 1967

White House Memorandum

La Casa Bianca, Promemoria

In another daily update, Walt Rostow reports to President Johnson that "we are

99% sure that 'Che' Guevara is dead".

Rostow believes the decision to execute Guevara "is stupid", but he also points out

his death "shows the soundness of our 'preventive medicine' assistance to

countries facing incipient insurgency - it was the Bolivian 2nd Ranger Battalion,

trained by our Green Berets from June-September of this year, that cornered him

and got him".

Scarica il documento qui (traducibile online)

12 ottobre 1967

Department of State, Guevara's Death - The Meaning for Latin

America

Dipartimento di Stato, Morte di Guevara - Il significato per

l'America Latina

In this interpretive report for Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Thomas Hughes, the

Latin America specialist at the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and

Research, summarizes the importance of "the defeat of the foremost tactician of the

Cuban revolutionary strategy".

The analyst predicts that Guevara "will be eulogized as the model revolutionary who

met a heroic death".

The circumstances of his failure in Bolivia, however, will strengthen the position of

"peaceful line" communist party groups in the Hemisphere.

Castro, he argues, will be subject to "we told you so" criticism from older leftist

parties, but his "spell on the more youthful elements in the hemisphere will not be

broken".

The analysis fails to incorporate evidence of the disagreement between Castro and

Guevara on the prospects for revolution in Latin America, or the Soviet pressure on

Cuba to reduce support for insurgent movements in the Hemisphere.

Scarica il documento qui (traducibile online)

13 ottobre 1967

White House Memorandum

La Casa Bianca, Promemoria

In a final update, Walt Rostow informs Lyndon Johnson that the White House has

intelligence information - still censored - that "removes any doubt that 'Che'

Guevara is dead".

Scarica il documento qui (traducibile online)

17 ottobre 1967

CIA, Intelligence Information Cable

CIA, Telegramma informativo dell'Intelligence

This CIA cable summarizes intelligence, gathered from September 1966 through June

1967, on the disagreement between the Soviet Union and Cuba over Che Guevara's

mission to Bolivia.

The cable provides specific information on Leonid Brezhnev's objections to "the

dispatch of Ernesto Che Guevara to Bolivia" and Brezhnev's decision to send the

Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin's visit to Cuba in June, 1967 to discuss the

Kremlin's opposition with Castro.

CIA sources reported that Kosygin accused Castro of "harming the communist

cause through his sponsorship of guerrilla activity ... and through providing support

to various anti-government groups, which although they claimed to be 'socialist' or

communist, were engaged in disputes with the 'legitimate' Latin American

communist parties ... favored by the USSR".

In replying Castro stated that Cuba would support the "right of every Latin American

to contribute to the liberation of his country".

Castro also "accused the USSR of having turned its back upon its own revolutionary

tradition and of having moved to a point where it would refuse to support any

revolutionary movement unless the actions of the latter contributed to the

achievement of Soviet objectives ...".

Scarica il documento qui (traducibile online)

18 ottobre 1967

State Department Cable, Official Confirmation of Death of Che

Guevara

Dipartimento di Stato, Telegramma - Conferma ufficiale della

morte di Che Guevara

Ten days after his capture, U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia, Douglas Henderson,

transmitted confirmation of Guevara's death to Washington.

The evidence included autopsy reports, and fingerprint analysis conducted by

Argentine police officials on Che's amputated hands.

(Che's hands were cut off to provide proof that he was actually dead;

under the supervision of CIA agent Gustavo Villoldo, his body was then secretly

buried by at a desolate airstrip at Villagrande where it was only discovered in June

1997.)

The various death documents, notes Ambassador Henderson, leave "unsaid the time

of death" - "an attempt to bridge the difference between a series of earlier

divergent statements from Armed Forces sources, ranging from assertions that he

died during or shortly after battle to those suggesting he survived at least twenty-

four hours".

Scarica il documento qui (traducibile online)

19 ottobre 1967

CIA, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Fidel Castro

Delivers Eulogy on Che Guevara

CIA, Servizio di Rassegna dei Media Stranieri, Fidel Castro

pronuncia discorso in elogio di Che Guevara

On October 18, 1967, the third day of national mourning, Fidel Castro delivered a

eulogy to a crowd of almost one million at the Plaza de La Revolución in Havana.

The next day, the speech is transcribed and distributed by FBIS, a CIA transcription

agency that records, and translates news and television from around the world.

Calling Guevara "an artist of revolutionary warfare", Castro warns that "they who

sing victory" over his death - a reference to the U.S. - "are mistaken.

They are mistaken who believe that his death is the defeat of his ideas, the defeat

of his tactics, the defeat of his guerrilla concepts".

This speech contributes immeasurably to the making of the revolutionary icon that

Che Guevara became in the ensuing years.

"If we want to know how we want our children to be", Castro concludes, "we should

say, with all our revolutionary mind and heart:

We want them to be like Che".

Scarica il documento qui (traducibile online)

28 novembre 1967

Southern Command, Activities of the 2nd Ranger Battalion and

Death of Che Guevara

Comando Meridionale, [Rapporto sulle] Attività del

2° Battaglione Ranger e morte di Che Guevara

The U.S. Special Forces Group, which trained the Bolivan military units that captured

Che Guevara, conducted an extensive debriefing of members of the 2nd Ranger

Battalion.

This report, based on interviews by a member of the U.S. Mobile Training Team in

Bolivia with key Bolivian commanders, documents the military movements, and

engagement with Che Guevara's guerrilla band.

The sources also provide key details and descriptions of his capture, interrogation

and execution, although it makes no mention of the CIA official, Félix Rodríguez, who

was present.

Guevara's last words to the soldier who shot him are reported as:

"Know this now, you are killing a man".

Scarica il documento qui (traducibile online)

3 giugno 1975

CIA, Debriefing of Félix Rodríguez

CIA, Rapporto di Félix Rodríguez

When Che Guevara was executed in La Higuera, one CIA official was present

- a Cuban-American operative named Félix Rodríguez.

Rodríguez, who used the codename "Félix Ramos" in Bolivia and posed as a Bolivian

military officer, was secretly debriefed on his role by the CIA's office of he Inspector

General in June, 1975.

(At the time the CIA was the focus of a major Congressional investigation into its

assassination operations against foreign leaders.)

In this debriefing - discovered in a declassified file marked "Félix Rodríguez" by

journalist David Corn - Rodríguez recounts the details of his mission to Bolivia where

the CIA sent him, and another Cuban-American agent, Gustavo Villoldo, to assist the

capture of Guevara and destruction of his guerrilla band.

Rodríguez and Villoldo became part of a CIA task force in Bolivia that included the

case officer for the operation, "Jim", another Cuban American, Mario Osiris Riveron,

and two agents in charge of communications in Santa Clara.

Rodríguez emerged as the most important member of the group;

after a lengthy interrogation of one captured guerrilla, he was instrumental in

focusing the efforts to the 2nd Ranger Battalion focus on the Villagrande region

where he believed Guevara's rebels were operating.

Although he apparently was under CIA instructions to "do everything possible to

keep him alive", Rodríguez transmitted the order to execute Guevara from the

Bolivian High Command to the soldiers at La Higueras - he also directed them not to

shoot Guevara in the face so that his wounds would appear to be combat-related -

and personally informed Che that he would be killed.

After the execution, Rodríguez took Che's Rolex watch, often proudly showing it to

reporters during the ensuing years.

Scarica il documento qui (traducibile online)

Aggiornamento n. 2

The Death of Che Guevara: A Chronology

Compiled by Paola Evans, Kim Healey, Peter Kornbluh, Ramón Cruz and Hannah

Elinson - The National Security Archive, The George Washington University

La morte di Che Guevara: una cronologia

Redatta da Paola Evans, Kim Healey, Peter Kornbluh, Ramón Cruz e Hannah Elinson

Archivio della Sicurezza Nazionale, Università George Washington, USA

October 3, 1965

In a public speech, Fidel Castro reads a "Farewell" letter written by Che in April, in

which Che resigns from all of his official positions within the Cuban government.

The letter, which Che apparently never intended to be made public, states that

"I have fulfilled the part of my duty that tied me to the Cuban revolution ... and I say

goodbye to you, to the comrades, to your people, who are now mine".

(CIA Intelligence Memorandum - "Castro and Communism: The Cuban Revolution

in Perspective", May 9, 1966)

October 18, 1965

A CIA Intelligence Memorandum discusses what analysts perceive as Che Guevara's

fall from power within the Cuban government beginning in 1964.

It states that at the end of 1963, Guevara's plan of "rapid industrialization and

centralization during the first years of the Revolution brought the economy to its

lowest point since Castro came to power".

"Guevara's outlook, which approximated present-day Chinese - rather than Soviet -

economic practice, was behind the controversy".

In July 1964, "two important cabinet appointments signaled the power struggle over

internal economic policy which culminated in Guevara's elimination".

Another conflict was that Guevara wanted to export the Cuban Revolution to different

parts of Latin America and Africa, while "other Cuban leaders began to devote most

of their attention to the internal problems of the Revolution".

In December, 1964, Guevara departed on a three-month trip to the United States,

Africa, and China.

When he returned, according to the CIA report, his economic and foreign policies

were in disfavor and he left to start revolutionary struggles in other parts of the

world.

(CIA Intelligence Memorandum - "The Fall of Che Guevara and the Changing Face of

the Cuban Revolution", October 18, 1965)

Fall, 1966

Che Guevara arrives in Bolivia sometime between the second week of September

and the first of November of 1966, according to different sources.

He enters the country with forged Uruguayan passports to organize and lead a

communist guerrilla movement.

Che chooses Bolivia as the revolutionary base for various reasons.

First, Bolivia is of lower priority than Caribbean Basin countries to US security

interests and poses a less immediate threat, "... the Yanquis wouldn't concern

themselves...".

Second, Bolivia's social conditions and poverty are such that Bolivia is considered

susceptible to revolutionary ideology.

Finally, Bolivia shares a border with five other countries, which would allow the

revolution to spread easily if the guerrillas are successful.

(Harris - 60, 73; Rojo - 193-194; Rodríguez 1 - 157; Rodríguez 1 - 198)

Spring, 1967

From March to August of 1967, Che Guevara and his guerrilla band strike "pretty

much at will" against the Bolivian Armed Forces, which totals about twenty thousand

men.

The guerrillas lose only one man compared to 30 of the Bolivians during these six

months.

(James - 250; NYT, September 16, 1967)

April 28, 1967

General Ovando, of the Bolivian Armed Forces, and the U.S. Army Section signed a

Memorandum of Understanding with regard to the 2nd Ranger Battalion of the

Bolivian Army "which clearly defines the terms of U.S.-Bolivian Armed Forces

cooperation in the activation, organization, and training of this unit".

May 11, 1967

Walt Rostow, presidential advisor to Lyndon B. Johnson, sends a message to the

President saying that he received the first credible report that "Che" Guevara is alive

and operating in South America, although more evidence is needed.

(Rostow, May 11, 1967)

June, 1967

Cuban-American CIA agent Félix Rodríguez receives a phone call from a CIA officer,

Larry S., who proposes a special assignment for him in South America in which he

will use his skills in unconventional warfare, counter-guerrilla operations and

communications.

The assignment is to assist the Bolivians in tracking down and capturing Che

Guevara and his band.

His partner will be "Eduardo González" and Rodríguez is to use the cover name

"Félix Ramos Medina".

(Rodríguez 1 - 148)

June 26-30, 1967

Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin visits Cuba for discussions with Fidel Castro.

According to a CIA intelligence cable, the primary purpose of his "trip to Havana

June 26-30, 1967 was to inform Castro concerning the Middle East Crisis...

A secondary but important reason for the trip was to discuss with Castro the

subject of Cuban revolutionary activity in Latin America".

The Soviet Premier criticizes the dispatch of Che Guevara to Bolivia and accuses

Castro of "harming the communist cause through his sponsorship of guerrilla

activity... and through providing support to various anti-government groups, which

although they claimed to be 'socialist' or communist, were engaged in disputes with

the 'legitimate' Latin American communist parties, those favored by the USSR".

In reply Castro stated that Cuba will support the "right of every Latin American to

contribute to the liberation of his country".

(CIA - Intelligence Information Cable, October 17, 1967)

August 2, 1967

Rodríguez and González arrive in La Paz, Bolivia.

They are met by their case officer, Jim, another CIA agent, and a Bolivian immigration

officer.

The CIA station in La Paz is run by John Tilton; eventually the CIA's Guevara task

force is joined by another anti-Castro Cuban-American agent, Gustavo Villoldo.

(Rodríguez 1 - 162)

August 31, 1967

The Bolivian army scores its first victory against the guerrillas, wiping out one-third

of Che's men.

José Castillo Chávez, also known as Paco, is captured and the guerrillas are forced

to retreat.

Che's health begins to deteriorate.

(James - 250, 269)

September 3, 1967

Félix Rodríguez flies with Major Arnaldo Saucedo from Santa Cruz to Vallegrande to

interrogate Paco.

(Rodríguez 1 - 167)

September 15, 1967

The Bolivian Government air-drops leaflets offering a $4,200 reward for the capture

of Che Guevara.

(NYT, September 16, 1967)

September 18, 1967

Fifteen members of a Communist group, who were providing supplies to the

guerrillas in the southeastern jungles of Bolivia, are arrested.

(NYT, September 19, 1967)

September 22, 1967

Che's guerrillas arrive at Alto Seco village in Bolivia.

Inti Peredo, a Bolivian guerrilla, gives the villagers a lecture on the objectives of the

guerrilla movement.

The group leaves later that night after purchasing a large amount of food.

(Harris - 123)

According to Jon Lee Anderson's account, Che takes the food from a grocery store

without paying for it after discovering that the local authorities in Alto Seco have left

to inform the army about the guerrilla's position.

(Anderson - 785)

Guevara Arze, the Bolivian Foreign Minister, provides evidence to the Organization of

American States to prove that Che Guevara is indeed leading the guerrilla operations

in Bolivia.

Excerpts taken from captured documents, including comparisons of handwriting,

fingerprints and photographs, suggests that the guerrillas are comprised of Cubans,

Peruvians, Argentineans and Bolivians.

The foreign minister's presentation draws a loud applause from the Bolivian

audience, and he gives his assurance that "we're not going to let anybody steal our

country away from us. Nobody, at any time".

(NYT, September 23, 1967)

September 24, 1967

Che and his men arrive, exhausted and sick, at Loma Larga, a ranch close to Alto

Seco.

All but one of the peasants flee upon their arrival.

(Harris - 123)

September 26, 1967

The guerrillas move to the village of La Higuera and immediately notice that all the

men are gone.

The villagers have previously been warned that the guerrillas are in the area and they

should send any information on them to Vallegrande.

The remaining villagers tell the guerrillas that most of the people are at a celebration

in a neighboring town called Jahue.

(Harris - 123)

1 p.m.:

As they are about to depart for Jahue, the rebels hear shots coming from the road

and are forced to stay in the village and defend themselves.

Three guerrillas are killed in the gun battle: Roberto (Coco) Peredo, a Bolivian

guerrilla leader who was one of Che's most important men;

"Antonio," believed to be Cuban; and "Julio," likely a Bolivian.

Che orders his men to evacuate the village along a road leading to Rio Grande.

The Army High Command and the Barriento Government consider this encounter a

significant victory.

Indeed, Che notes in his diary that La Higuera has caused great losses for him in

respect to his rebel cell.

(Harris - 123, 124; NYT, Semptember 28, 1967)

CIA agent, Félix Rodríguez, under the alias, "Captain Ramos", urges Colonel Zenteno

to move his Rangers battalion from La Esperanza headquarters to Vallegrande.

The death of Antonio, the vanguard commander [also called Miguel by Rodríguez],

prompts Rodríguez to conclude that Che must be close by.

Colonel Zenteno argues that the battalion has not yet finished their training, but he

will move them as soon as this training is complete.

Convinced that he knows Che's next move, Rodríguez continues pressuring Zenteno

to order the 2nd Ranger battalion into combat.

(Rodríguez 1 - 184)

September 26-27, 1967

After the battle of La Higueras, the Ranger Battalion sets up a screening force along

the river San Antonio to prevent exfiltration of the guerrilla force.

During the mission, the troops capture a guerrilla known as "Gamba".

He appears to be in poor health and is poorly clothed.

This produces an immediate morale effect on the troops because they notice that the

guerrillas are not as strong as they thought.

"Gamba" says that he had separated from the group and was traveling in hope of

contacting "Ramón" (Guevara).

(Dept. of Defense - Intelligence Information Report, November 28, 1967)

September 29, 1967

Colonel Zenteno is finally persuaded by Rodríguez, and he moves the 2nd Ranger

battalion to Vallegrande.

Rodríguez joins these six hundred and fifty men who have been trained by U.S.

Special Forces Major "Pappy" Shelton.

(Rodríguez 1 - 184)

September 30, 1967

Che and his group are trapped by the army in a jungle canyon in Valle Serrano, south

of the Grande River.

(NYT, October 1, 1967)

October 7, 1967

The last entry in Che's diary is recorded exactly eleven months since the

inauguration of the guerrilla movement.

The guerrillas run into an old woman herding goats.

They ask her if there are soldiers in the area but are unable to get any reliable

information.

Scared that she will report them, they pay her 50 pesos to keep quiet.

In Che's diary it is noted that he has "little hope" that she will do so.

(Harris - 126; CIA - Weekly Review, "The Che Guevara Diary", December 15, 1967)

Evening:

Che and his men stop to rest in a ravine in Quebrada del Yuro.

(Harris - 126)

October 8, 1967

The troops receive information that there is a band of 17 guerrillas in the Churro

Ravine.

They enter the area and encounters a group of 6 to 8 guerrillas, opens fire, and killed

two Cubans, "Antonio" and "Orturo".

"Ramon" (Guevara) and "Willy" try to break out in the direction of the mortar section,

where Guevara is wounded in the lower calf.

(Dept. of Defense - Intelligence Information Report, November 28, 1967)

A peasant women alerts the army that she heard voices along the banks of the Yuro

close to the spot where it runs along the San Antonio river.

It is unknown whether it is the same peasant woman that the guerrillas ran into

previously.

(Rojo - 218)

By morning, several companies of Bolivian Rangers are deployed through the area

that Guevara's Guerrillas are in.

They take up positions in the same ravine as the guerrillas in Quebrada del Yuro.

(Harris - 126)

About 12 p.m.:

A unit from General Prado's company, all recent graduates of the U.S. Army Special

Forces training camp, confronts the guerrillas, killing two soldiers and wounding

many others.

(Harris - 127)

1:30 p.m.:

Che's final battle commences in Quebrada del Yuro.

Simon Cuba (Willy) Sarabia, a Bolivian miner, leads the rebel group.

Che is behind him and is shot in the leg several times.

Sarabia picks up Che and tries to carry him away from the line of fire.

The firing starts again and Che's beret is knocked off.

Sarabia sits Che on the ground so he can return the fire.

Encircled at less than ten yards distance, the Rangers concentrate their fire on him,

riddling him with bullets.

Che attempts to keep firing, but cannot keep his gun up with only one arm.

He is hit again on his right leg, his gun is knocked out of his hand and his right

forearm is pierced.

As soldiers approach Che he shouts, "Do not shoot!

I am Che Guevara and worth more to you alive than dead".

The battle ends at approximately 3:30 p.m.

Che is taken prisoner.

(Rojo - 219; James - 14)

Other sources claim that Sarabia is captured alive and at about 4 p.m. he and Che are

brought before Captain Prado.

Captain Prado orders his radio operator to signal the divisional headquarters in

Vallegrande informing them that Che is captured.

The coded message sent is "Hello Saturno, we have Papá!".

Saturno is the code for Colonel Joaquin Zenteno, commandant of the Eighth Bolivian

Army Division, and Papá is code for Che.

In disbelief, Colonel Zenteno asks Capt. Prado to confirm the message.

With confirmation, "general euphoria" erupts among the divisional headquarters

staff.

Colonel Zenteno radios Capt. Prado and tells him to immediately transfer Che and

any other prisoners to La Higuera.

(Harris - 127)

In Vallegrande, Félix Rodríguez receives the message over the radio:

"Papá cansado", which means "Dad is tired".

Papá is the code for foreigner, implying Che.

Tired signifies captured or wounded.

(Rodríguez 1 - 185)

Stretched out on a blanket, Che is carried by four soldiers to La Higuera, seven

kilometers away.

Sarabia is forced to walk behind with his hands tied against his back.

Just after dark the group arrives in La Higuera and both Che and Sarabia are put into

the one-room schoolhouse.

Later that night, five more guerrillas are brought in.

(Harris - 127)

Official army dispatches falsely report that Che is killed in the clash in southeastern

Bolivia, and other official reports confirm the killing of Che and state that the Bolivian

army has his body.

However, the army high command does not confirm this report.

(NYT, October 10, 1967)

October 9, 1967

Walt Rostow sends a memorandum to the President with tentative information that

the Bolivians have captured Che Guevara.

The Bolivian unit engaged in the operation was the one that had been trained by the

U.S.

(Rostow, October 9, 1967)

6:15 a.m.:

Félix Rodríguez arrives by helicopter in La Higuera, along with Colonel Joaquín

Zenteno Anaya. Rodríguez brings a powerful portable field radio and a camera with a

special four-footed stand used to photograph documents.

He quietly observes the scene in the schoolhouse, and records what he sees, finding

the situation "gruesome" with Che lying in dirt, his arms tied behind his back and his

feet bound together, next to the bodies of his friends.

He looks "like a piece of trash" with matted hair, torn clothes, and wearing only

pieces of leather on his feet for shoes.

In one interview, Rodríguez states that, "I had mixed emotions when I first arrived

there.

Here was the man who had assassinated many of my countrymen.

And nevertheless, when I saw him, the way he looked...

I felt really sorry for him".

(Rodríguez 2)

Rodríguez sets up his radio and transmits a coded message to the CIA station in

either Peru or Brazil to be retransmitted to Langley headquarters.

Rodríguez also starts to photograph Che's diary and other captured documents.

Later, Rodríguez spends time talking with Che and takes a picture with him.

The photos that Rodríguez takes are preserved by the CIA.

(Anderson - 793; Rodríguez 1 - 193)

10 am:

The Bolivian officers are faced with the question of what to do with Che.

The possibility of prosecuting him is ruled out because a trial would focus world

attention on him and could generate sympathetic propaganda for Che and for Cuba.

It is concluded that Che must be executed immediately, but it is agreed upon that the

official story will be that he died from wounds received in battle.

Félix Rodríguez receives a call from Vallegrande and is ordered by the Superior

Command to conduct Operation Five Hundred and Six Hundred.

Five hundred is the Bolivian code for Che and six hundred is the order to kill him.

Rodríguez informs Colonel Zenteno of the order, but also tells him that the U.S.

Government has instructed him to keep Che alive at all costs.

The CIA and the U.S. Government have arranged helicopters and airplanes to take

Che to Panama for interrogation.

However, Colonel Zenteno says he must obey his own orders and Rodríguez decides,

"to let history take its course", and to leave the matter in the hands of the Bolivians.

(Anderson - 795; Harris - 128, 129; Rodríguez 1 - 193; Rodríguez 2)

Rodríguez realizes that he cannot stall any longer when a school teacher informs him

that she has heard a news report on Che's death on her radio.

Rodríguez enters the schoolhouse to tell Che of the orders from the Bolivian high

command.

Che understands and says, "It is better like this... I never should have been

captured alive".

Che gives Rodríguez a message for his wife and for Fidel, they embrace and

Rodríguez leaves the room.

(Rodríguez 2; Anderson - 796)

According to one source, the top ranking officers in La Higuera instruct the

noncommissioned officers to carry out the order and straws are drawn to determine

who will execute Che.

Just before noon, having drawn the shortest straw, Sergeant Jaime Terán goes to the

schoolhouse to execute Che.

Terán finds Che propped up against the wall and Che asks him to wait a moment until

he stands up.

Terán is frightened, runs away and is ordered back by Colonel Selich and Colonel

Zenteno.

"Still trembling" he returns to the schoolhouse and without looking at Che's face he

fires into his chest and side.

Several soldiers, also wanting to shoot Che, enter the room and shoot him.

(Harris - 129)

Félix Rodríguez has stated that, "I told the Sargento to shoot ... and I understand that

he borrowed an M-2 carbine from a Lt. Pérez who was in the area".

Rodríguez places the time of the shooting at 1:10 p.m. Bolivian time.

(Rodríguez 2)

In Jon Lee Anderson's account, Sergeant Terán volunteers to shoot Che.

Che's last words, which are addressed to Terán, are "I know you've come to kill me.

Shoot, you are only going to kill a man".

Terán shoots Che in the arms and legs and then in Che's thorax, filling his lungs

with blood.

(Anderson - 796)

Early in the morning, the unit receives the order to execute Guevara and the other

prisoners.

Lt. Pérez asks Guevara if he wishes anything before his execution.

Guevara replies that he only wishes to "die with a full stomach".

Pérez asks him if he is a "materialist" and Guevara answers only "perhaps".

When Sgt. Terán (the executioner) enters the room, Guevara stands up with his

hands tied and states, "I know what you have come for I am ready".

Terán tells him to be seated and leaves the room for a few moments.

While Terán was outside, Sgt. Huacka enters another small house, where "Willy" was

being held, and shoots him.

When Terán comes back, Guevara stands up and refuses to be seated saying:

"I will remain standing for this".

Terán gets angry and tells Guevara to be seated again.

Finally, Guevara tells him: "Know this now, you are killing a man".

Terán fires his M2 Carbine and kills him.

(Dept. of Defense - Intelligence Information Report, November 28, 1967)

Later that afternoon:

Senior army officers and CIA Agent, Félix Rodríguez, leave La Higuera by helicopter

for army headquarters in Vallegrande.

Upon landing, Rodríguez quickly leaves the helicopter knowing that Castro's people

will be there looking for CIA agents.

Pulling a Bolivian army cap over his face, he is not noticed by anyone.

(Rodríguez 1 - 12; Harris - 130)

Che's body is flown to Vallegrande by helicopter and later fingerprinted and

embalmed.

(NYT, October 11, 1967)

General Ovando, Chief of Bolivian Armed Forces, states that just before he died, Che

said, "I am Che Guevara and I have failed".

(James - 8)

October 10, 1967

W.G. Bowdler sends a note to Walt Rostow saying that they do not know if Che

Guevara was "among the casualties of the October 8 engagement".

They think that there are no guerrilla survivors.

By October 9, they thought two guerrilla were wounded and possibly one of them is

Che.

(Bowdler - The White House, October 10, 1967)

Two doctors, Moisés Abraham Baptista and José Martínez Cazo, at the Hospital

Knights of Malta, Vallegrande, Bolivia, sign a death certificate for Che Guevara.

The document states that "on October 9 at 5:30 p.m., there arrived... Ernesto

Guevara Lynch, approximately 40 years of age, the cause of death being multiple

bullet wounds in the thorax and extremities.

Preservative was applied to the body".

On the same day, and autopsy report records the multiple bullets wounds found in

Guevara's body.

"The cause of death", states the autopsy report, "was the thorax wounds and

consequent hemorrhaging".

(U.S. Embassy, La Paz, Bolivia - Airgram, October 18, 1967)

General Ovando announces that Che died the day before at 1:30 p.m.

This means that Che lived for twenty-two hours after the battle in Quebrada del Yuro,

which contradicts Colonel Zenteno's story.

Colonel Zenteno changes his story to support General Ovando's.

(James - 15) 

The New York Times reports that the Bolivian Army High Command dispatches

officially confirm that Che was killed in the battle on Sunday October 8th.

General Ovando states that Che admitted his identity and the failure of his guerrilla

campaign before dying of his wounds.

(NYT, October 10, 1967)

Ernesto Guevara, the father of Che, denies the death of his son, stating that there is

no evidence to prove the killing.

(NYT, October 11, 1967)

October 11, 1967

General Ovando claims that on this day Che's body is buried in the Vallegrande area.

(James - 19)

President Lyndon Johnson receives a memorandum from Walt W. Rostow:

"This morning we are about 99% sure that 'Che' Guevara is dead".

The memo informs the President that according to the CIA, Che was taken alive and

after a short interrogation General Ovando ordered his execution.

(Rostow - "Death of Che Guevara", October 11, 1967)

Walt Rostow sends a memorandum to the President stating that they

"are 99% sure that 'Che' Guevara is dead".

He explains that Guevara's death carries significant implications:

"It marks the passing of another of the aggressive, romantic revolutionaries...

In the Latin American context, it will have a strong impact in discouraging would-be

guerrillas.

It shows the soundness of our 'preventive medicine' assistance to countries facing

incipient insurgency - it was the Bolivian 2nd Ranger Battalion, trained by our Green

Berets from June-September of this year, that cornered him and got him".

(Rostow, October 11, 1967)

October 12, 1967

Che's brother, Roberto, arrives in Bolivia to take the body back to Argentina.

However, General Ovando tells him that the body has been cremated.

(Anderson - 799)

October 13, 1967

Walt Rostow sends a note to the President with intelligence information that

"removes any doubt that 'Che' Guevara is dead".

(Rostow, October 13, 1967)

October 14, 1967

Annex No. 3:

Three officials of the Argentine Federal police, at the request of the Bolivian

Government, visited Bolivian military headquarters in La Paz to help identify the

handwriting and fingerprints of Che Guevara.

"They were shown a metal container in which were two amputated hands in a liquid

solution, apparently formaldehyde".

The experts compared the fingerprints with the ones in Guevara's Argentine

identity record, No. 3.524.272, and they were the same.

(U.S. Embassy, La Paz, Bolivia - Airgram, October 18, 1967)

Students at Central University of Venezuela protest the U.S. involvement in Che's

death.

Demonstrations are organized against a U.S. business, the home of a U.S. citizen, the

U.S. Embassy and other similar targets.

October 15, 1967

Bolivian President Barrientos claims that Che's ashes are buried in a hidden place

somewhere in the Vallegrande region.

(Harris - 130)

October 16, 1967

The Bolivian Armed Forces released a communiqué together with three annexes on

the death of Che Guevara.

The communiqué is "based on documents released by the Military High Command

on October 9 ... concerning the combat that took place at La Higuera between units

of the Armed Forces and the red group commanded by Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, as a

result of which he, among others, lost his life...".

The report states that Guevara died "more or less at 8 p.m. on Sunday, October 8 ...

as a result of his wounds".

Also, in order to identify his body it requested the cooperation of Argentine technical

organizations to identify the remains to certify that the handwriting of the campaign

diary coincides with Guevara's.

Henderson, the U.S. Embassy agent in La Paz, comments that "it will be widely

noted that neither the death certificate nor the autopsy report state a time of death".

This "would appear to be an attempt to bridge the difference between a series of

earlier divergent statements from Armed Forces sources, ranging from assertions

that he died during or shortly after battle to those suggesting he survived at least

twenty-four hours".

He also notes that some early reports indicate that Guevara was captured with minor

injuries, while later statements , including the autopsy report, affirm that he suffered

multiple wounds.

He agrees with a comment by Preséncia, that these statements are "going to be the

new focus of polemics in the coming days".

(U.S. Embassy, La Paz, Bolivia - Airgram, October 18, 1967)

October 18, 1967

The U.S. Embassy in La Paz, Bolivia sends an airgram to the Department of State

with the Official Confirmation of Death of Che Guevara.

(U.S. Embassy, La Paz, Bolivia - October 18, 1967)

A CIA cable highlights the errors leading to Guevara's defeat.

"There were negative factors and tremendous errors involved in the death of

Ernesto 'Che' Guevara Serna and the defeat of the guerrillas in Bolivia...".

Che's presence at the guerrilla front in Bolivia, "... precluded all hope of saving him

and the other leaders in the event of an ambush and virtually condemned them to

die or exist uselessly as fugitives".

The fact that the guerrillas were so dependent on the local peasant population also

proved to be a mistake according to the CIA.

Another error described in this cable is Che's over-confidence in the Bolivian

Communist Party, which was relatively new, inexperienced, lacking strong leadership

and was internally divided into Trotskyite and Pro-Chinese factions.

Finally, the cable states that the victory of the Bolivian Army should not be credited

to their actions, but to the errors of Castroism.

"The guerrilla failure in Bolivia is definitely a leadership failure...".

("Comments on the death of Ernesto 'Che' Guevara Serna", October 18, 1967)

Fidel Castro delivers a eulogy for Che Guevara to nearly a million people - one of his

largest audiences ever - in Havana's Plaza de la Revolución.

Castro proclaims that Che's life-long struggle against imperialism and his ideals will

be the inspiration for future generations of revolutionaries.

His life was a "glorious page of history" because of his extraordinary military

accomplishments, and his unequaled combination of virtues which made him an

"artist in guerrilla warfare".

Castro professes that Che's murderers will be disappointed when they realize that

"the art to which he dedicated his life and intelligence cannot die".

(Anderson - 798; Castro's Eulogy, October 18, 1967)

October 19, 1967

Intelligence and Research's Cuba specialist, Thomas L. Hughes, writes a

memorandum to Secretary of State, Dean Rusk.

Hughes outlines two significant outcomes of Che Guevara's death that will affect

Fidel Castro's future political strategies.

One is that "Guevara will be eulogized as the model revolutionary who met a heroic

death", particularly among future generations of Latin American youth. Castro can

utilize this to continue justifying his defiance of the usual suspects - "US

imperialism, the Green Berets, the CIA".

Another outcome is that Castro will reassess his expectations of Sexporting

revolutions to other Latin American countries.

Some Latin American leftists "will be able to argue that any insurgency must be

indigenous and that only local parties know when local conditions are right for

revolution".

(Intelligence and Research - Memorandum "Guevara's Death - The Meaning for

Latin America", October 19, 1967)

November 8, 1967

The CIA reports that Cuba is threatening assassin a prominent Bolivian figure, such

as President Barrientos or General Ovando, in revenge of Che Guevara's death.

(CIA - Cable, November 8, 1967)

July 1, 1995

In an interview with biographer Jon Lee Anderson, Bolivian General Mario Vargas

Salinas reveals that "he had been a part of a nocturnal burial detail, that Che's body

and those of several of his comrades were buried in a mass grave near the dirt

airstrip outside the little mountain town of Vallegrande in Central Bolivia".

A subsequent Anderson article in the New York Times sets off a two-year search to

find and identify Guevara's remains.

(Anderson - 1)

July 5, 1997

Che Guevara biographer, Jon Lee Anderson, reports for the New York Times that

although the remains have not been exhumed and definitely identified, two experts

are "100 percent sure" that they have discovered Che's remains in Vallegrande.

The fact that one of the skeletons is missing both of its hands is cited as the most

compelling evidence.

(NYT, July 5, 1997)

July 13, 1997

A ceremony in Havana, attended by Fidel Castro and other Cuban officials, marks the

return of Che's remains to Cuba.

(NYT, July 14, 1997)

October 17, 1997

In a ceremony attended by Castro and thousands of Cubans, Che Guevara is

reburied in Santa Clara, Cuba.

(NYT, October 18, 1997)

List of Sources

Anderson

Anderson, Jon Lee

"Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life"

Grove Press, 1997

Harris

Harris, Richard

"Death of a Revolutionary: Che Guevara's Last Mission"

W.W. Norton and Company Inc., 1970

James

James, Daniel

"Che Guevara: A Biography"

Stein and Day, 1970

National Security Files

"Bolivia, Vol. 4"

Box 8

NYT

New York Times

Rodríguez 1

Rodríguez, Félix

"Shadow Warrior"

Simon and Schuster Inc., 1989

Rodríguez 2

Rodríguez, Félix

"Executive Action"

BBC documentary, 1992

Rojo

Rojo, Ricardo

"My Friend Che"

The Dial Press Inc., 1968

WT

Washington Times

Aggiornamento n. 3

Che Guevara and the CIA in the Mountains of Bolivia

Published in Washington, DC, October 9, 2020

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book #725 Edited

by John Prados and Arturo Jimenez-Bacardi

The National Security Archive - The George Washington University

Argentine-born Revolutionary Executed 53 Years Ago
 

Declassified Records Describe Intense U.S. Tracking of Guevara's Movements, Initial

Doubts about His Death, and Hopes that His Violent Demise Would Discourage

Revolutionaries in Latin America
 

Fifty-three years ago, at 1:15 p.m. on October 9, 1967, Argentine-born revolutionary

Ernesto "Che" Guevara was executed in the hills of Bolivia after being captured by a

U.S.-trained Bolivian military battalion.

A CIA operative, Felix Rodriguez, was present.

U.S. officials had been tracking Guevara's whereabouts ever since he disappeared

from public view in Cuba in 1965.

The highest White House officials were intensely interested in confirming his death,

then using it to undermine leftist revolutionary movements in Latin America, as a

selection of White House and CIA documents posted today by the National Security

Archive describes.

President Lyndon Johnson himself received regular updates on Guevara's

whereabouts, the record shows, reflecting continuing, deep concerns over Cuban-

inspired revolutionary activity in the region.

Today's posting features National Security Council memos, CIA field reports, and

other documents that follow several strands of the story, from Guevara's ill-fated

campaign in Bolivia, to La Paz's request for U.S. help in creating a "hunter-killer"

team to "ferret out guerrillas", to reports of Che's last conversation and execution

(provided by an under-cover CIA officer at the scene), to the intensive efforts of the

United States to mount a posthumous propaganda campaign based on Guevara's

diary and other captured records.

In a number of cases the documents have previously been released but are now

available with fewer security redactions.

The materials are selections from the recent digitized documentary compilation, "CIA

Covert Operations III: From Kennedy to Nixon, 1961-1974", part of the Digital National

Security Archive series published by ProQuest.

It is the third in an ongoing series edited by John Prados and focuses decision

making and operations in the Caribbean, South America, on CIA Africa, Iraq,

Indonesia, and elsewhere.

The records relating to Cuba build on the previous work of the National Security

Archive's Cuba Project, directed by Peter Kornbluh, which has produced many

groundbreaking publications on Guevara, Fidel Castro, and U.S.-Cuba relations.  

Che Guevara e la CIA nelle montagne della Bolivia

Pubblicato a Washington, DC, 9 ottobre 2020

Archivio Elettronico della Sicurezza Nazionale, Raccolta No. 725 di Note Informative

Archivio Elettronico della Sicurezza Nazionale - Università George Washington

Rivoluzionario di origine argentina giustiziato 53 anni fa
 

Documenti declassificati descrivono un intenso monitoraggio statunitense dei

movimenti di Guevara, i dubbi iniziali sulla sua morte e le speranze che la sua fine

violenta scoraggerebbe i rivoluzionari in America Latina

Cinquantatre anni fa, alle 13:15 il 9 ottobre 1967, il rivoluzionario argentino Ernesto

"Che" Guevara fu giustiziato sulle colline della Bolivia dopo essere stato catturato

da un battaglione militare boliviano addestrato negli Stati Uniti.

Era presente un agente della CIA, Felix Rodriguez.

I funzionari statunitensi avevano seguito le tracce di Guevara da quando era

scomparso dalla vista del pubblico a Cuba nel 1965.

I più alti funzionari della Casa Bianca erano intensamente interessati a confermare

la sua morte, per poi usarla per minare i movimenti rivoluzionari di sinistra in

America Latina, come descrive una selezione di documenti della Casa Bianca e

della CIA pubblicati oggi dal National Security Archive.

Lo stesso Presidente Lyndon Johnson ha ricevuto aggiornamenti regolari su dove

si trova Guevara, il documento mostra, riflettendo le continue e profonde

preoccupazioni per l'attività rivoluzionaria di ispirazione cubana nella regione.

La pubblicazione di oggi contiene promemoria del Consiglio di Sicurezza Nazionale,

rapporti sul campo della CIA e altri documenti che seguono diversi filoni della

storia, dalla sfortunata campagna di Guevara in Bolivia, alla richiesta di La Paz per

l'aiuto degli Stati Uniti nella creazione di una squadra di "cacciatori-assassini" a

"stanare i guerriglieri", ai rapporti sull'ultima conversazione ed esecuzione del Che

(forniti da un ufficiale della CIA sotto copertura sulla scena), agli sforzi intensi degli

Stati Uniti per organizzare una campagna di propaganda postuma basata sul diario

di Guevara e su altri documenti captati.

In un certo numero di casi i documenti sono stati precedentemente rilasciati ma ora

sono disponibili con meno revisioni di censura per motivi di sicurezza.

I materiali sono selezioni dalla recente raccolta di documentari digitalizzati, "CIA

Operationi Segrete III: Da Kennedy a Nixon, 1961-1974", parte della serie

dell'Archivio Elettronico della Sicurezza Nazionale pubblicata da ProQuest.

 

È il terzo di una serie in redazione a cura di John Prados e si concentra sul

processo decisionale e sulle operazioni della CIA nei Caraibi, Sud America, Africa,

Iraq, Indonesia e altrove.

 

I documenti relativi a Cuba si basano sul lavoro precedente del Progetto Cuba

dell'Archivio per la Sicurezza Nazionale, diretto da Peter Kornbluh, che ha prodotto

molte pubblicazioni inedite su Guevara, Fidel Castro e le relazioni USA-Cuba.

Document 01

April 22, 1967 (declassified August 12, 1991)

"Guerrilla Situation - Bolivia", State Department Cable, La Paz

2697

"Situazione della guerriglia in Bolivia", Dipartimento di Stato,

La Paz - Telegramma 2697

Source: Lyndon Baines Johnson Library: Lyndon B. Johnson Papers: National

Security File (hereafter LBJL: LBJP: NSF): Country File: Latin America, b. 8, f.:

"Bolivia v. 4 (1/66-12/68)".

After visiting Bolivia and meeting President Barrientos, U.S. General William Tope

assesses the guerrilla situation in the Andes, warning of major challenges ahead.

Barrientos informs the Americans that the Bolivian Army is investigating reports of

"a group of bearded armed men…" spotted around Chuquisaca.

Barrientos says the guerrillas are a "well organized, highly trained and well supplied

group… and are at present maintaining contact with Salta, Argentina; Venezuela;

and even Cuba".

Concerned about the broader security implications of the guerrilleros, Barrientos

stresses that "the army must come up with some kind of a quick success".

Yet, General Tope counsels that "unfortunately, all of their quick fixes are unsound,

would waste precious resources and probably would get them in worse trouble

than they already have".

Tope further laments that "Since we have not yet figured out how to pull a rabbit out

of the hat for them either, they are very difficult to divert from this line of thinking".

He recommends that Barrientos use "individuals who have received counter-

insurgency training from us in the past", to which the Bolivian responds that they

had already done so.

Fearing Bolivian incompetence, Tope concludes the telegram by highlighting the

need for a significant U.S. role, "It is obvious we must take a practical, pragmatic

[sic] approach, building on what they now have, forcing improvements toward

sound objectives, assisting all we can when there is the goal, and preventing the

waste of either US or Bolivian resources when it is not".  

Document 02

April 25, 1967 (declassified April 23, 1991)

No heading, NSC - Memorandum, William Bowdler to Walt

Rostow

Senza titolo, NSC - Promemoria di William Bowdler per Walt

Rostow

Source: LBJL: LBJP: NSF: Country File: Latin America, b. 8, f.: "Bolivia v. 4 (1/66-

12/68) 1 of 3".

In this sobering memo on the counter-insurgency capabilities of the Bolivian

Government, staffer William G. Bowdler forwards to National Security Adviser

Rostow the Embassy's April 22 cable (see Document 01), which he calls a "grim

report", and warns that "The problem is not only adequacy of the troops in the field,

but the attitude of those at the top, including Barrientos".

Bowdler explains that supplies have been sent to support U.S. troops already in the

field and "We are concentrating on the training and equipping of a new Ranger

battalion".

Document 03

May 10, 1967 (declassified January 10, 2011)

"The Presence of Ernesto 'Che' Guevara with the Bolivian

Guerrillas...", CIA Intelligence Information Cable

"La presenza di Ernesto 'Che' Guevara con i guerriglieri

boliviani...", CIA - Telegramma di intelligence

Source: LBJL: LBJP: NSF: Country File: Latin America, b. 8, f.: "Bolivia v. 4 (1/66-

12/68) 3 of 3."

This is the first CIA field report of "persons who claimed to have seen and talked

with 'Che' Guevara since he disappeared in March 1965".

Based in large part on the interrogations of several captured persons, including

Régis Debray, the CIA explains that Guevara "was present with the main group of

Bolivian guerrillas in Southeast Bolivia from late March until at least 20 April 1967".

Document 04

May 11, 1967 (declassified November 28, 2013)

No heading, NSC - Memorandum, Walt Rostow to President

Johnson

Senza titolo, NSC - Promemoria di Walt Rostow per il

Presidente Johnson

Source: LBJL: LBJP: NSF: Country File: Latin America, b. 8, f.: "Bolivia, v. 4 (1/66-

12/68) 3 of 3"

In this memo, National Security Adviser Walt Rostow explains to the President that

there is a credible report (Document 3) that Guevara is "alive and operating in South

America" (highlight in original).

Rostow concludes by noting that "we need more evidence before concluding that

Guevara is operational - and not dead, as the intelligence community, with the

passage of time, has been more and more inclined to believe".

A previous release of this document redacted the source for this report

- "interrogation of guerrillas captured in Bolivia, among them Jules Debray, the

young French Marxist who has been close to Castro".

Document 05

May 17, 1967 (declassified January 10, 2011)

"Statements by Jules Régis Debray...", CIA Intelligence

Information Cable 

"Dichiarazioni di Jules Régis Debray...", CIA - Telegramma

di intelligence 

Source: LBJL: LBJP: NSF: Country File: Latin America, b. 8, f.: "Bolivia v. 4 (1/66-12/68)

2 of 3"

This intelligence summary based on the interrogation of Régis Debray describes

three meetings the French intellectual had with Guevara.

Debray explains that Guevara is trying to create a movement and funding source

outside of Cuba as, "Guevara and Fidel Castro were not in total agreement, and that

Guevara was trying to build mechanisms independent of Cuba, to support his

personal revolutionary efforts".

The support was to come mainly from Europe, according to Debray, as the

movement, "was to be organized and backed by Bertrand Russell of England, Jean

Paul Sartre of France and Alberto Moravia of Italy, and was to support 'Che' Guevara

and his guerrilla movement in Latin America … the moral and financial support was

to come from individuals in Europe".

Document 06

June 14, 1967 (declassified October 23, 2013)

"Cuban-Inspired Guerrilla Activity in Bolivia", CIA Memorandum

"Attività di guerriglia di ispirazione cubana in Bolivia", CIA

- Promemoria

Source: NSF: Intelligence file, b. 2, f.: "Guerrilla Problem in Latin America."

This dire CIA intelligence assessment warns that there are currently seven distinct

guerrilla groups in Bolivia and "Their presence poses a grave threat to Bolivian

stability".

The analysts highlight the role played by Cuba and worry that the USSR could also

intervene, "It has been evident from the outset that Cuba has played a key role in

the initiation, implementation and execution of guerrilla activity in Bolivia".

The report explains that "Ernesto 'Che' Guevara according to several reports from

different sources, is personally directing Bolivian guerrilla activities and has been

physically present with the guerrillas in Bolivia".

Consistent with past intelligence assessments, the CIA sees the government of

President Barrientos as incompetent, having "repeatedly demonstrated its total

inability to cope with the guerrillas".

The analysts think it is possible that the guerrilla situation could create a climate for

a left-wing coup in Bolivia and broader regional instability, "This could lead to a

government composed of a loose coalition of leftist parties.

Both President Juan Carlos Ongania, of Argentina and President Eduardo Frei, of

Chile agreed at a summit conference in Uruguay in April 1967, that if Barrientos is

overthrown and replaced with a left-wing leader like Juan Lechin Oquendo, they

will intervene with their armed forces".

Document 07

June 23, 1967 (declassified November 25, 2013)

No heading [Suspecting "Che" is in Bolivia], NSC -

Memorandum, Walt Rostow to President Johnson

Senza titolo [Si sospetta che il "Che" si trovi in Bolivia], NSC

- Promemoria di Walt Rostow per il Presidente Johnson

Source: LBJL: LBJP: NSF: Country File: Latin America, b. 8, f.: "Bolivia v. 4 (1/66-

12/68) 2 of 3"

This memo to the President from his national security adviser presents an update on

the Bolivian guerrilla situation and highlights the "interrogation of several deserters

and prisoners, including a young [sic] French communist - Jules Régis Debray -

closely associated with Fidel Castro and suspected of serving as a Cuban courier".

The interrogation of these individuals "strongly suggests that the guerrillas are

Cuban-sponsored, although this is hard to document.

There is some evidence that 'Che' Guevara may have been with the group.

Debray reports seeing him".

Rostow then explains U.S. efforts: "Soon after the presence of guerrillas had been

established we sent a special team and some equipment to help organize another

Ranger-type Battalion.

On the military side, we are helping about as fast as the Bolivians are able to absorb

our assistance" and "CIA has increased its operations".

Rostow concludes by noting that "while the outlook is not clear", U.S. efforts should

make a positive difference.

Document 08

June 23, 1967 (declassified May 26, 1992)

"Crisis Management in Bolivia: Government Flounders but

Keeps its Footing", State Department, Bureau of Intelligence

and Research - Intelligence Note 521

"Gestione della crisi in Bolivia: il Governo vacilla ma mantiene

la sua posizione", Dipartimento di Stato, Ufficio di Intelligence e

Ricerca - Nota di intelligence 521

Source: LBJL: NSF: Intelligence File, b. 2, f.: "Guerrilla Problem in Latin America."

This intelligence assessment from the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and

Research (INR) downplays some of CIA's more dire conclusions.

On the threat posed by guerrilla movements, it notes, "There have been rumors of

possible new guerrilla 'fronts', but such reports seem somewhat overdrawn and

unrealistic in view of the small size of the guerrilla movement, estimated to number

about 60 members.

We have seen no evidence of successful recruiting efforts by the guerrillas

…

The present guerrilla movement can probably evade and harass the counter-

insurgent forces for an indefinite period, but it does not in itself and at its present

size constitute a serious threat to the government".

Ultimately, the analysts at State conclude that the stability of Bolivia is dependent on

whether Barrientos makes concessions with disaffected groups or uses repression.

"The greatest danger in the short term would lie in the coalescence of groups or

movements capable of violence.

If the government should take harshly repressive measures against the miners,

that coalescence [sic] might occur.

However, Barrientos has not authorized such measures thus far and his chances of

avoiding drastic action seem somewhat better than even".

Document 09

June 29, 1967 (declassified January 4, 2018)

No heading [Mentions CIA "hunter-killer" squad], NSC

- Memorandum of Conversation, William Bowdler and Bolivian

Ambassador Sanjines-Goytia

Senza titolo [Menziona la squadra di "cacciatori-assassini"

della CIA], NSC - Promemoria del colloquio tra William Bowdler

e l'Ambasciatore boliviano Sanjines-Goytia

Source: LBJL: LBJP: NSF: Country File: Latin America, b. 8, f.: "Bolivia v. 4 (1/66-

12/68) 3 of 3"

This startling memcon by Bowdler summarizes his discussion with Bolivian

Ambassador Julio Sanjines-Goytia, who requests U.S. assistance for the

establishment of "what he called a 'hunter killer' team to ferret out guerrillas".

The ambassador explained that "this idea was not original with him, but came from

friends of his in CIA".

Bowdler then asks if "the Ranger Battalion now in training were not sufficient", to

which Ambassador Sanjines-Coytia replies that what he had in mind are, "50 or 60

young army officers, with sufficient intelligence, motivation and drive, who could

be trained quickly and could be counted on to search out the guerrillas with tenacity

and courage".

Bowdler tells the ambassador that "his idea may have merit, but needs further

careful examination".

Document 10

July 28, 1967 (declassified January 10, 2011)

"Guerrilla Band in Southeast Bolivia under the Command

of Ernesto 'Che' Guevara", NSC - Note, William Bowdler to Walt

Rostow, enclosing CIA Intelligence Information Cable

"Banda di guerriglieri nel Sud-Est della Bolivia sotto il comando

di Ernesto 'Che' Guevara", NSC - Nota di William Bowdler per

Walt Rostow, con allegato telegramma di intelligence della CIA

Source: LBJL: LBJP: NSF: Country File: Latin America, b. 8, f.: "Bolivia v.4 (1/66-

12/68) 2 of 3"

This brief cover note from Bowdler refers to its lengthy CIA attachment:

"This does not constitute proof that Che Guevara is alive and operating in Bolivia

but it certainly heightens the possibility.

I think the President might like to read this one".

The report is based on the written statement by captured Argentine revolutionary

Ciro Roverto Bustos, who explained that when he arrived at the Bolivian guerrilla

camp, one guerrillero with a Cuban accent told him that the commander, "Ramon",

was none other than Guevara.

Guevara did not want his presence known because, "the struggle should be a

Bolivian movement, and only when it was well developed and his participation,

along with his Cubans, was a simple fact of proletarian-revolutionary

internationalism, should his presence be made known".

The report explains in detail Guevara's strategic objective which places the U.S. at

the center of the revolutionary struggle:

"the underlying political basis for this is that the struggle against imperialism is the

factor common to all Latin American nations.

Imperialism is the real enemy, not the oligarchies, which are enemies of form

rather than substance.

Because the real enemy is a common one for all of Latin America, a new strategy is

necessary.

This strategy must start from the premise that in Latin America no single country

can now or in the future carry out the revolution alone, not even a government

supported by its own army and by its people.

It would merely produce palliatives and imitations of change, but it would not make

revolution.

One country alone is quickly surrounded, strangled, and subjugated by the

imperialists because revolution is a socio-economic fact and not a romantic,

patriotic event.

Economic underdevelopment in Latin America is caused by imperialism and its

total control.

Change will be possible only when there is total opposition.

It is necessary, therefore, to unite the total strength of the Latin American nations in

a decisive confrontation against the United States" [underlining in the original].

Document 11

September 1, 1967 (declassified March 22, 1996)

"The Bolivian Guerrilla Movement: An Interim Assessment",

NSC - Memorandum, William Bowdler to Walt Rostow, covering

CIA Intelligence Memorandum

"Il movimento di guerriglia boliviano: valutazione temporanea",

NSC - Promemoria di William Bowdler per Walt Rostow, relativo

al promemoria di intelligence della CIA

Source: LBJL: LBJP: NSF: Country File: Latin America, b. 8, f.: "Bolivia v. 4 (1/66-

12/68) 3 of 3"

In this intelligence assessment, the CIA concludes that, the success of the guerrilla

movement in Bolivia "is due largely to the ineptitude of the Bolivian military".

Conversely, Bowdler in his cover note to Rostow, describes the report as "the next

thing to a whitewash and is being rewritten.

Autocriticism is sometimes hard to take.

A great deal of the fault lies with the Bolivians.

But there are areas where we clearly fall down".

In the report, CIA analysts highlight the unique strengths of the Bolivian guerrillas:

"one major point is clear.

The Bolivian guerrillas are a well trained and disciplined group.

The insurgents are better led and better equipped than the untrained, poorly

organized Bolivian military forces" [underlining in original].

On the leadership of the guerrillas, the CIA carefully qualifies the intelligence on

Guevara:

"A few known Bolivian Communists have been identified as leaders of the

insurgents.

Other reports from within Bolivia and elsewhere allege that one of the leaders is

Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, the Argentine-born revolutionary who was a key figure in

the Castro Government in Cuba until he dropped out of sight in March 1965.

These reports, which come from sources of varying credibility, are in essential

agreement on the details of where and when Guevara is supposed to have been

with the guerrillas, but conclusive evidence of Che's direct participation has not

been obtained.

Whether Guevara is a participant, or indeed whether he is even alive, it is plain in

any case that the guerrilla leaders are well-schooled in the insurgency techniques

and doctrines previously espoused by Guevara" [underlining in original].

The agency concludes by suggesting that this case might have broader

repercussions:

"because worldwide publicity has been given both to the alleged presence of Che

Guevara with the guerrillas and to the capture of [Régis] Debray, this insurgency

movement will be kept in the public eye.

It could become a focus for the continuing polemical debate in the Communist

world over the wisdom of political versus militant revolutionary action".

Document 12

September 2, 1967 (declassified May 26, 1992)

"Handling of Documents Relating to Cuban Intervention

Captured in Bolivia", State Department Memorandum, Covey

T. Oliver to Foy D. Kohler

"Utilizzo dei documenti comprovanti l'intervento cubano captati

in Bolivia", Dipartimento di Stato - Promemoria di Covey T.

Oliver per Foy D. Kohler

Source: LBJL: NSF: Intelligence File, b. 2, f.: "Guerrilla Problem in Latin America."

This memorandum presents several proposals for handling captured documents

taken from Che Guevara's camp by Bolivian troops in early August and turned over

to the Americans.

The concern is that the revelation of the U.S. as the sole authentication source of the

documents might carry some risks.

The strategic value of the documents is assessed.

Recommendations are that Bolivia only make public some documents and that La

Paz should seek public assistance from the U.S. and other countries simultaneously

in order to minimize U.S. exposure.

Option 3, in which Bolivia announces possession of captured documents and

publicly asks the U.S. for help analyzing them, and Option 4, in which Bolivia would

expand the circle to include all OAS members, garner the most support.

American officials are aware of the Bolivian desire that the documents be used as

evidence in the Régis Debray trial.

The U.S. role should be protected given that, "The Communists, for example, may

assert we fabricated the documents.

The French press may charge we are out to get Debray, etc.".

Document 13

September 5, 1967 (declassified November 25, 2013)

"Insurgency in Bolivia", NSC - Memorandum, Walt Rostow to

President Johnson

"Insurrezione in Bolivia", NSC - Promemoria di Walt Rostow per

il Presidente Johnson

Source: LBJL: LBJP: NSF: Country File: Latin America, b. 8, f.: "Bolivia, v. 4 (1/66-

12/68) 3 of 3"

In this memorandum for the President, Rostow explains two major developments

concerning the Bolivian situation.

First, after the capture of several guerrilla documents, "The preliminary reading from

CIA shows rather conclusively that 'Che' Guevara travelled to Bolivia via Spain and

Brazil in late 1966 using false documents".

Second, "Bolivian armed forces on August 30 finally scored their first victory and it

seems to have been a big one.

An army unit caught up with the rearguard of the guerrillas and killed 10 and

captured one … two of the dead guerrillas are Bolivians and the rest either Cubans

or Argentines".

Rostow recommends that "it is not in our interest, or the Bolivians', to have the U.S.

appear as the sole authenticating agent for the documents".

Document 14

September 6, 1967 (declassified June 27, 2013)

"Captured Documents in Bolivia", NSC - Memorandum, William

Bowdler to Walt Rostow